🌍 FOREIGN-BORN SHARE
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Long-term indicator Β· Demographic pace

The pace, not the origin.

15
United States Β· foreign-born share of population (%)
Roughly one in seven US residents was born abroad β€” near the highest level in the nation's history.
At about 15%, the foreign-born share sits at or above the 1890 "Great Wave" peak of 14.8%, after falling to a low of 4.7% in 1970 β€” a deep U-curve. This page reads the pace of absorption, not the origin of anyone: the 2021–25 rise was the fastest four-year gain on record, and the share has just begun to tick down β€” its first decline since the 1960s.
Source: US Census / MPI / Pew Β· estimates range 14.8–15.8% by source and month
πŸ“Š Verified numbers

A U-curve, from peak to trough and back

14.8%
1890 Β· the old Great Wave peak
4.7%
1970 Β· the historic low
~15%
Today Β· at or above the record
βš–οΈ What this indicator measures
Absorption capacity β€” a question of rate, not race.
Let us be unambiguous: this indicator is not about where migrants come from, and carries no judgment about any group. It measures a structural variable β€” the pace of demographic change relative to a society's capacity to integrate it. Immigration is, for the US, a profound strength: it is the main answer to sub-replacement fertility and ageing.

The signal is double-edged. Too little β€” the 4.7% of 1970 β€” and a society ages, shrinks and closes. Too fast, and integration strains: Robert Putnam found that in the short run, rapid diversity lowers social trust for everyone, before new shared identities re-form. The healthy reading is a sustainable, absorbable pace β€” high enough to renew the nation, measured enough to weave newcomers in.
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In the short run, rapid diversity tends to lower social solidarity; in the long run, successful societies rebuild it through new, cross-cutting identities. The pace is what decides which run you are in.
β€” after Robert Putnam, E Pluribus Unum (2007) β€” whose hopeful long run he himself called, in part, speculative
πŸ“š Three nations meeting the same question

Not whether to welcome β€” but how fast a society can weave.

A century of American experience
πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡Έ The Great Wave β€” and the pause that followed
1880 β†’ 1965 Β· surge, restriction, absorption, reopening
Imagine America in 1890: 14.8% foreign-born, a Great Wave from Europe crowding the tenements of New York and Chicago. The response, over the next generation, was restriction β€” the 1924 quotas cut arrivals sharply, and the foreign-born share slid to just 4.7% by 1970. That long pause let the Great Wave's children assimilate into a shared American identity β€” but restriction also had a dark cost: the same quotas turned away Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Europe. In 1965 America reopened its doors, and the U-curve began its climb back.
⚑ The wow effect
America has run this experiment before β€” and it worked, but slowly, and not without cruelty. The lesson is not "open" or "closed," but that absorption takes time, and that both extremes carry a moral price.
Recent history Β· Sweden
πŸ‡ΈπŸ‡ͺ When the pace outran the plan
1990 β†’ today Β· generosity, then a rethink
Imagine Sweden, long one of the most open nations on earth, taking in refugees at among the highest per-capita rates in Europe β€” peaking around 2015. A humane instinct, and in many ways a success. But the pace outran integration: by the 2020s, mainstream figures across the spectrum β€” including Social Democratic leaders, not only the right β€” publicly acknowledged problems of segregation and parallel communities, and the government under Ulf Kristersson tightened policy from 2022. The lesson was never about the newcomers' origins; it was about how fast institutions could weave them in.
⚑ The wow effect
Sweden's reckoning was cross-partisan precisely because the issue was structural, not ideological: even the most welcoming society discovered that welcome without a workable pace of integration eventually strains the social fabric.
Recent history Β· United Kingdom
πŸ‡¬πŸ‡§ London, remade in a generation
2001 β†’ 2021 Β· speed as the story
Imagine London across just two decades. Its foreign-born share rose from about 22% (1991) to 37% (2011); the share identifying as White British fell from 60% (2001) to 37% (2021). This is one of the fastest compositional shifts any major world city has recorded β€” and, crucially, London remained prosperous, dynamic and largely peaceful throughout. It is offered here not as alarm but as magnitude: proof of how quickly a place can change, and a live test of Putnam's question about whether shared identity re-forms in time.
⚑ The wow effect
A global capital rewrote its demographic profile in twenty years and kept thriving β€” evidence that rapid change need not mean decline, so long as the institutions of belonging keep pace.

America absorbed its Great Wave; Sweden learned the cost of outrunning integration; London shows both the speed and the resilience of modern change. The Beaver watches the rate of the river, never the source of the water.

πŸ“ˆ US foreign-born share Β· 1850 β†’ 2024

The great U-curve of American immigration.

1850
9.7%
1890
14.8%
1930
11.6%
1970
4.7%
2000
11.1%
2024
~15%

Foreign-born as a share of US population (Census; MPI/Pew/CIS estimates for the latest year range 14.8–15.8%). The 1924 quotas drove the long descent to the 1970 low; the 1965 Act began the climb back. Immigration is projected to become the sole driver of US population growth from about 2030 (CBO) β€” the demographic stakes behind the number.

🧭 The structural reading

Why the rate β€” not the source β€” is the variable that matters

01 Β· SOCIOLOGICAL β€” the short-run hunker, the long-run weave
Trust dips, then can recover
Putnam's robust finding: in rapidly diversifying places, people of all backgrounds initially "hunker down" β€” trust and cooperation fall in the short run. His hopeful sequel, that new cross-cutting identities restore solidarity over time, he candidly conceded rests on thinner, more speculative evidence. So the pace matters directly: it sets whether a community is stuck in the dip or has time to weave. This ties straight to the social-trust indicator.
02 Β· GEOPOLITICAL β€” internal Β· the most polarising number
55%
wanted less immigration Β· 2024 (Gallup)
When change outruns visible integration, backlash follows β€” immigration is now among the most polarising issues in Western democracies, and a prime fuel of populist realignment. But restriction carries its own costs: labour shortages, a shrinking tax base, faster ageing. An honest barometer flags both failure modes β€” the closed door and the door flung open faster than the house can absorb.
03 Β· GEOPOLITICAL β€” external Β· the demographic trump card
America's edge β€” if it can absorb
While China, Japan, Russia and much of Europe face steep demographic decline, immigration is the United States' great advantage β€” the reason it can keep growing where rivals shrink (from ~2030, it will be the only source of US population growth). But that advantage is conditional on absorption: newcomers become national strength only when woven into a shared identity. Manage the pace, and diversity is a superpower; mismanage it, and it is a fracture rivals will exploit.
The engine works
absorption is America's gift
The optimistic case is strong: the US is history's most successful assimilation machine β€” the Great Wave was absorbed, and Putnam's own examples (the military, religious congregations) show diversity forged into unity. The recent slight decline in the share may itself ease the absorption task. The lever is integration and pace β€” language, work, mixing, citizenship β€” never origin. Get those right and this indicator turns from a stressor into the nation's deepest renewable strength.
🧬 Methodology
Reading = the foreign-born share of the US population (Census Bureau; Migration Policy Institute; Pew), latest ~15% β€” at or above the 1890 peak of 14.8%, versus the 1970 low of 4.7%. Estimates differ by source and month (MPI ~14.8%, Pew ~15.4%, CIS ~15.8%) and the share has recently declined slightly β€” read the trend, not a single decimal. The thesis is absorption pace, not origin (Putnam's short-run "hunkering," with his own long-run caveat; Collier). Explicitly non-nativist; ties to fertility. Note to editors: the data key is named "foreignBornBirths" but the metric is the population share, not births β€” worth renaming; also worth a "predictive/provisional" tag given the live decline. No invented numbers.